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CHAPTER

FIVE

The Legitimacy of
International Law
David Lefkowitz

The conduct of international affairs is subject to three kinds of normative
standards. The first of these is prudence or rational self-interest, and its most
common manifestation in international affairs involves reference to a state's
national interest as a basis for defending or critiquing its international
conduct. Justice provides a second metric for assessing the international
conduct of states, and sometimes other actors, and a set of normative concepts including freedom, equality and fairness with which to argue for or
against particular acts or policies. Law, including both international law and
the foreign law of particular states, provides the third normative framework
commonly employed by those engaged in or otherwise concerned with international affairs. Thus an international act, such as one state's invasion of
another, can be criticized as imprudent, and/or as unjust and/or as illegal. As
normative claims, each of these criticisms purports to give the invading state
a reason to desist, and at least in the case of the second and third criticisms,
entails that the invaded state and perhaps other actors (for example, other
states) have a reason to treat the invading state in ways they would not otherwise be justified in doing. The focus of this chapter is on how international
law performs this function; that is, it aims to explain why and when the fact
that an act would violate international law in itself provides an actor with a
reason, indeed a moral obligation, not to perform it. The answer, I shall argue,
is that international law does so if and only if it is legitimate.
I begin in the first section with an analysis of the concept of legitimacy.
What does it mean to attribute legitimacy to international law, or to characterize the legal framework that constitutes, say, the World Trade Organization
(WfO) as illegitimate? Sections 2-3 consider a number of possible grounds
for international law's legitimacy, including the contributions it can make
to its subjects' ability to act as they have most reason to act, the consent of
those it claims as subjects, considerations of fair-play, and its democratic
credentials. My focus in each case is twofold: first, with arguments for thinking that a particular ground is either necessary or sufficient for international
law's legitimacy; and, second, with the implications the account in question
has for international law's present claim to legitimacy. As will become clear,
none of the grounds for international law's legitimacy considered herein,
98

c::;:::::;:::============::::::::::::::l:::::::::I
TheLegitimacyof InternationalLaw c:::::J
separately or in combination, show the existing international legal order to
be fully legitimate; indeed, it likely falls well short of that (perhaps ideal)
standard. Still, just as the failure of any existing social order to realize a
conception of justice does not by itself provide a reason to reject that conception, so too the failure of the international legal order to qualify as legitimate
according to some standard of legitimacy does not by itself provide a reason
to reject that standard. I conclude in section 4 by offering a number ofreasons
why we should care about international law's legitimacy; indeed, why from
a moral point of view increasing the international legal order's legitimacy
might even take priority over making it more just.

1 The Concept of Legitimacy
Judgments of political legitimacy concern attempts to rule or govern. A
attempts to rule or govern B with respect to some domain of conduct if and
only if A maintains that Bought to defer to A's judgment regarding what B
may, must or must not do; that is, if and only if A claims practical authority
over B.1 When A does so, she maintains that her directives provide B with
content-independent and exclusionary reasons for action. So, if A claims
authority over B and she directs B not to <I>,then she maintains that B has a
reason not to <I>simply because A instructed him not do so, a reason that
makes no reference to the content of A's direction to B (i.e., what <I>-ingis).
Moreover, she maintains that B ought to treat A's instruction not to <I>as a
reason to exclude from his deliberation some or all of the reasons he might
have to <I>.
From B's perspective, to treat A's directive as a content-independent
and exclusionary reason just is to defer to A's judgment; that is, to recognize
her as having practical authority over him.
A's attempt to rule over B is legitimate if and only if A has a right to rule B,
a right that correlates to B's duty to obey A. Strictly speaking, what the subject
of a legitimate authority owes her is not conduct, but a certain form of deliberation or practical reasoning, one that treats the authority's directives as
content-independent and exclusionary reasons for action. In terms of
Hohfeld's (1919) well-known typology of rights, then, the right to rule should
be understood as a moral power rather than a claim-right, with the authority's subjects bearers of a moral liability (to have their deliberation shaped by
the authority's directives) rather than a duty. Particular conduct may also be
owed to the ruler, but it need not be. For example, and in Hohfeldian terms,
B may have a duty not to damage C's property, one correlative to C's property
right, and a liability to A's judgment regarding what counts as damage to C's
property (i.e., what the content of C's property right is), correlative to A's
moral power to direct B's conduct (vis-a-visC's property). Getting clear on this
conceptual point is important ifwe are to avoid the common but mistaken
assumption that a successful theory of legitimacy must explain how those
subject to a putative authority can owe it conduct in accordance with its
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directives. Nevertheless, and at the risk of inviting this confusion, I will continue to speak of subjects' duty to obey an authority, since this is the language
commonly employed in discussions of legitimacy.
To claim the right to rule is not to have it. If A's attempt to rule over Bis
illegitimate, then while A may claim that B ought to treat her instruction not
to <I>as a content-independent and exclusionary reason, B has no duty to do
so. Note, however, that B may still have prudential or moral reasons not to
<I>,perhaps even conclusive ones; the denial of a putative authority's legitimacy is neither equivalent to, nor entails, the claim that an agent should not
act as the putative authority would have him act. Moreover, A's attempt to
rule over B may correctly be judged to be good, or at least better than the
likely alternatives, even if A has no right to rule B. Both of these points bear
emphasis, since, as will become clear below, at present international law
often lacks the authority it claims; that is, it is illegitimate. A mistaken understanding of what follows from this conclusion may explain why some theorists argue that we ought to use a less demanding conception of legitimacy,
one that correlates to duties of support and non-interference but not to a duty
to obey, and/or employ more easily satisfied criteria to justify claims to legitimacy when theorizing international law than we do when theorizing municipal or state law (Buchanan, 2010). Once we recognize that agents can have
compelling reasons to support illegitimate institutions, to work for their
reform rather than their elimination or wholesale replacement, we should
find unpersuasive this rationale for introducing different conceptions of
legitimacy, or different standards for when legal institutions enjoy it. 2
Some theorists maintain that, in addition to the right to issue authoritative
directives, the concept oflegitimacy includes the right to enforce those directives, or more generally the right to impose costs on those who fail to act as
directed or to grant benefits to those who do. The tendency to do so may reflect
the common description of certain uses of force as legitimate or illegitimate,
or the fact that much theorizing about the concept of legitimacy takes as its
subject modern states' attempts at governance. Whatever the cause, we should
reject this characterization of legitimacy and instead treat enforcement, or
the imposition of costs or granting of benefits more generally, as simply
another form of conduct over which authority may be exercised, but not
conduct in which an agent must engage in order to qualify as an authority.
To claim authority over the enforcement of authoritative directives is simply
to claim the authority to determine who may use force against those who
fail to act as directed, when they may do so, and what form the use of force
may or may not take. In the modern state, those authorized to enforce the
law are often legal officials; that is, legislative and judicial officials authorize
officials of the executive branch of government to execute or enforce the law.
But this is not always the case; for example, modern states authorize private
actors to use force in self-defence, in light of which we often describe such
acts as legitimate. Within the international legal order, almost all law
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enforcement takes the form of legally authorized self-help. For instance, the
enforces the ruling of its dispute settlement body by authorizing the
party that brought the complaint to impose limited countermeasures against
the party found to be in violation of its legal obligations as a member of the
wro. We appear to have good reason, then, to characterize the conceptof
legitimacy solely in terms of the exercise of authority, even if the justifiability
of a putative authority's claim to legitimacy depends on its ability to reliably
impose costs on the disobedient and grant benefits to the obedient.
In crafting public international law, states and international organizations
assert that those subject to the law have a duty to obey it. The fact that a state
has an international legal obligation to forbear from armed intervention in
another state's territory except under very specific conditions is alleged to
provide it with a content-independent and exclusionary reason not to do so.
Similarly, as a signatory to the wro a state has an international legal obligation not to impose tariffs on select goods imported from other wro members
(again, except under very specific conditions), a legal obligation that is alleged
to provide it with a content-independent and exclusionary reason not to
perform these acts. What these legal obligations purport to exclude is a state
acting on its own judgment that armed intervention or the imposition of
tariffs will advance its national interest or promote justice. Whether these
judgments are true or false, if the international legal norms that create the
aforementioned obligations are legitimate, then states are not free to act on
those judgments, but must defer to the law's judgment that such acts ought
not to be performed.
With a clearer understanding of the concept of legitimacy, we can now
consider the conditions under which agents, and in particular international
legal officials, possess it. By 'international legal officials'~I mean state officials
engaged in crafting or applying international law, as well as officials in international legal institutions such as the wro and the International Court of
Justice (ICJ). International legal officials attempt to exercise authority by
issuing general rules or specific decisions that are intended to guide international legal subjects. Questions regarding the legitimacy ofinternational law,
then, are questions about when and why these attempts to exercise authority
succeed or fail - or put another way, when and why international legal subjects should or should not treat their legal obligations as providing them with
content-independent and exclusionary reasons for action.

wro

2 The Instrumental Argument for International
Law's Legitimacy
What makes international law legitimate?
Justifications ofauthority fall into one of two categories: those in which deference to authority is instrumental to the just treatment of others, and more
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broadly to acting as one has reason to act, and those in which deference to
authority is (also) constitutive of the just treatment of others. In contemporary debates, the first of these approaches is most closely associated with the
philosopher Joseph Raz, with John Tasioulas and Samantha Besson among
those who have drawn on Raz's work to offer an analysis of international
law's legitimacy (Raz, 1979, 2006; Besson, 2009; Tasioulas, 2010). According
to Raz, law is legitimate, or has a justified claim to authority vis-a-vis its subjects, when the following two conditions are met:
1 The Normal Justification Condition (NJC):The subject would better conform
to reasons that apply to him anyway (that is, to reasons other than the
directives of the authority) if he intends to be guided by the authority's
directives than if he does not.
2 The Independence Condition (IC):The matters regarding which the first
condition is met are such that, with respect to them, it is better to conform
to reason than to decide for oneself, unaided by authority (Raz, 2006:
1014).
A's claim to authority over B is justified, then, if B is more likely to act as he
has most reason to act by deferring to A's judgment regarding what he should
or should not do than by acting on his own judgment, except in cases where
it is more important that B decide for himself what to do than that he decide
correctly (i.e., than that he do what he has most reason to do). In such cases,
A enjoys a right to rule B, and B has a duty to obey A's directives.
Some theorists contend that the NJC does not suffice to justify one agent's
claim to authority over another. They argue that the mere fact that B will do
better at acting as he has most reason to act ifhe defers to A's judgment does
not entail that A has a right to rule B (e.g., Buchanan, 2010: 85). Raz concedes
this point in some cases, namely those where it is more important that an
agent act on his own judgment than that he act in accordance with right
reason. When and why this is the case is a point over which theorists may
disagree without disputing Raz's general account of when one agent's claim
to authority over another is justified. Moreover, it is not merely the fact that
an agent will do better at acting on the reasons that apply to him by deferring
to the law that renders the law legitimate. Rather, it is that fact in conjunction with the nature of the reasons that apply to the agent independently of
the law that does so. In the most general terms, ifB has a moral duty to treat
C justly, a reason for action that exists independently of the law, and if B is
more likely to fulfil that duty by obeying the law than by acting on his own
judgment, then those two facts suffice to establish the law's right to rule B.
If, in fact, Bis more likely to treat C justly if she defers to A's judgment regarding what that requires than if she acts on her own judgment, then it is hard
to see why that does not suffice to establish A's right to rule B properly conceived; that is, as A enjoying a moral power to determine the reasons for
action B ought to consider vis-a-vis her treatment of C, a power A exercises
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by issuing directives that provide B with content-independent and exclusionary reasons for action.
Some argue that satisfaction of the NJC cannot suffice to establish the law's
authority over an agent because, if it did, then even a deeply unjust state
could be legitimate (see, e.g., Christiano, 2008: 234). The fact that state officials or some of its subjects stand ready to perpetrate even greater injustices
if an individual does not act as the law directs may give the individual a
reason to treat the law as authoritative, but surely it does not entail that the
state has a right to rule the individual; that is, that it enjoys legitimate authority. In response, it is important first to keep in mind that on Raz's instrumental account the duty to obey (some of) the laws of an unjust state is owed not
to the state, but to those individuals a person is more likely to treat justly by
obeying the law than by acting on his or her own judgment. But second, we
should distinguish between the NJC being satisfied and an agent having good
reason to believe that it is. Subjects of a deeply unjust state will often have
little reason to believe that either its law or its legal institutions aim to
improve their conformity to the independent (moral) reasons that apply to
them; that is, that the law represents a good faith effort to satisfy the NJC.
Therefore, they will have little or no reason to treat it as authoritative - that
is, as providing them with content-independent and exclusionary reasons for
action. This is likely to be so even where, as a matter of fact, the law of a
deeply unjust state does satisfy the NJC, at least vis-a-vis some of its subjects.
In such cases, while the individuals in question ought to defer to the law
rather than act on their own judgment, they will likely not be blameworthy
for their failure to recognize that this is the case.
Suppose, arguendo, that the independence condition is met, and consider
how international law might help those over whom ir-claims jurisdiction to
improve their conformity to right reason, as I will label an agent's acting as
he, she or it has most reason to act. One way it may do so is by correcting for
ignorance or mistaken beliefs. Tasioulas offers as an example international
legal rules created via the enactment of multilateral treaties (2010: 101). The
process whereby such rules are crafted makes it likely that they reflect information that any single party to the convention would fail to acquire on its
own, and so fail to take into account when deciding how to act (e.g., what
particular foreign policy or domestic legal regime to adopt). Moreover, negotiations over multilateral treaties can serve as a useful corrective to biases
that undergird parties' mistaken beliefs, once again facilitating practical
reasoning that is better informed and so likely to more closely approximate
or conform to right reason than would unilateral decision-making. In some
cases, international law may also provide some of its subjects with access to
expertise they cannot produce domestically.
International law can also protect its subjects against what Tasioulas labels
volitional defects. For example, state officials may come under great pressure
from more powerful states, representatives of multinational corporations, or
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domestic interest groups to engage in conduct that promotes those actors'
perceived interests or vision of justice but that is contrary to right reason.
International law provides a mechanism for resisting such pressure.
International law's ability to steel its subjects against temptation is particularly important given the general human disposition to impatience, the tendency to treat oneself or one's circumstances as exceptional, and the fact that
the interests of legal officials in remaining in power may diverge from both
the long-term interests of the state's present and future members and the
demands of justice.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, international law can enhance its
subjects' conformity to right reason by solving collective action problems
(Buchanan and Keohane, 2006: 107-8; Besson, 2009: 352-7, 366-70; Tasioulas,
2010: 102). In some cases, it may do so by rendering more determinate a
shared but vague standard of right conduct, where the parties are rightly
indifferent between any of a number of possible ways in which the abstract
standard may be made more concrete. Far more common, however, is disagreement over what justice requires, forbids or permits with respect to the
use of force, international migration, trade in goods, financial transactions,
the use of and control over the oceans or the earth's atmosphere, etc. In all
these cases, international actors are generally likely to do better at approximating justice by conforming to common standards set out in international
law than by acting on their own judgment. In some cases, such as addressing
climate change, this may be because justice can only be achieved via the
cooperation of (nearly) all states. In other cases, the attempt by a state or
international organization to act on its own understanding of what justice
requires, and contrary to international law, may result in an immediate gain
in justice in one place, and/or vis-a-visone type of conduct, but a longer term
and greater reduction in justice in that place or in others, and vis-a-vis that
type of conduct or others. One reason this is so is that one state's genuinely
just war or trade regime may frequently appear to another to be an act of
aggression or protectionism. A second reason is that state officials acting in
bad faith may offer the example of another state's just but illegal conduct as
cover for their own unjust conduct. Each of these arguments points to the
likely bad consequences of deviating from the common standards of right
conduct set out in international law. I consider below additional, noninstrumental, justifications for the claim that actors have a duty to obey
international legal .norms that facilitate justic~nhancing
collective action.
International law can successfully address the problem of collective action
raised by differing understandings of justice only if most of those whose
cooperation is needed, especially the most powerful. take it to be authoritative. If other international legal subjects do not, then each party has little
reason to assume that conformity to international law per se is the best ·
means for it to approximate the just treatment of others and its own just
treatment by them. Thus, where international law's legitimacy is a function

c::============:i:::::::::::::;::::::;:;;:;:J
The Legitimacyof InternationalLaw c::::::J105
of its facilitating justice-approximating collective action, international law's
defacto legitimacy is a necessary condition for its de jure authority (Raz, 2006:
1036). It follows, Tasioulas notes, that 'in order to maintain this source of
legitimacy ... public international law must not stray too far from implementing values that resonate widely with its would-be subjects' (2010: 102). As a
consequence, at a given point in time the content of international law may
diverge considerably from what justice truly requires. Yet as long as international legal subjects are more likely to act justly (or, perhaps better, less likely
to act unjustly) by obeying international law than by acting on their own
judgment, they have a duty to do so.
The instrumental account entails that international law's legitimacy may
be piecemeal. For any particular international legal norm or legal regime,
the NJC may fail to establish its authoritativeness vis-a-vis some or even all of
the actors whose conduct it purports to direct. Generally speaking, existing
international law hews quite closely to the interests of powerful states (or
elites within those states), and gives highest priority to the preservation of
peace and stability, often at the expense of justice. As a consequence, its dictates may often diverge from what right reason requires precisely because it
is the result of legislative activities that are not undertaken on the basis of a
good faith effort to identify it. A full defence of these assertions would require
both an argument for a substantive conception of international or global
justice and a careful empirical analysis of existing international law, neither
of which I can carry out here. Still, even those who maintain that international law is not merely the product of power and interest acknowledge that
those two factors play a considerable role in·determining its content. If so,
then on the instrumental account a fair bit of scepticism regarding the extent
of international law's legitimacy seems warranted.

Howcan we identify legitimate internationallaw?
Thus far I have focused on the various ways in which international law can
satisfy the NJC.Yet a theory of the legitimacy of international law should do
more than explain the normative basis of international law's legitimacy that is, what makes it authoritative. It should also offer guidance on how to
identifylegitimate international law, reasons to believe that international law
or international legislators meet the normal justification condition. The
complex standard oflegitimacy for global governance institutions advocated
by Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane (2006) provides an excellent starting
point for developing such an account (see also Kumm, 2004).
The complex standard consists of a set of substantive and procedural
requirements that, when met, provide compelling evidence for the legitimacy
of a global governance institution's attempt to rule. 3 The former include not
persistently violating the least controversial human rights, not forgoing institutional changes that would provide greater benefits than existing ones and
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that are both feasible and accessible without excessive transition costs, and
not intentionally or knowingly engaging in conduct at odds with the global
governance institutions' purported aims and commitments. The latter include
mechanisms for holding global governance institutions accountable for
meeting the aforementioned substantive requirements as well as mechanisms for contesting the terms of accountability; that is, the ends that global
governance institutions ought to pursue and the means they should employ
in doing so. To be effective, mechanisms for holding officials accountable
must be broadly transparent. This includes making information about how
the institution works not only available, but accessible to both internal and
external actors, for example inspectors general and nongovernmental organizations, as well as the provision of public justifications for the most consequential efforts at governance.
What unifies the various elements of the complex standard is that they all
provide the legal subjects of global governance institutions with reason to
believe that officials in these institutions are making a good faith effort to
determine what justice requires. The point may be clearer ifwe consider the
converse: the absence of one or more elements of the complex standard of
legitimacy gives those subject to an attempt at global governance reason to
doubt that the putative rulers aspire to enhance their subjects' conformity
to right reason. Instead, subjects may suspect, and perhaps rightly so, that
governance is being exercised in pursuit of other goals, such as the national
interest of powerful states or the private interests of businesses or religious
groups, and contrary to the demands of justice. Consider, for example, the
substantive elements of the complex standard: no attempt at international
governance, either by global governance institutions or by states that persistently violated 'the least controversial human rights' or that systematically
discriminated in the application and enforcement of international legal
norms, could plausibly claim to be making a good faith effort to enhance its
subjects' conformity to right reason. The procedural elements that comprise
the complex standard evidence a good faith effort to determine what right
reason requires partly because they militate against efforts to deploy international law for private interest rather than the public or common good, and
partly because they improve the quantity and quality of the information on
the basis of which global governance is conducted. As the first of these claims
implies, the complex standard's procedural elements are desirable not only
for their epistemic value but also because they are likely to facilitate efforts
at governance that actually succeed in being legitimate; that is, that actually
meet the normal justification for authority. As an example of the second
claim, the requirement that global governance institutions facilitate effective
engagement with external epistemic agents such as Human Rights W~tch and
the International Committee of the Red Cross likely leads to more informed
and less biased rules and decisions than either these institutions' officials or
those they directly or indirectly govern would achieve on their own.
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3 Non-Instrumental Arguments for International
Law's Legitimacy
International law's value as a means for enhancing its subjects' conformity
to right reason is not the only ground theorists have offered for its legitimacy.
Many have sought instead, or at least in addition, to defend non-instrumental
accounts, according to which obedience to legitimate international law constitutes the just treatment of others. At least since the nineteenth century the
most prominent such account used to justify international law's claim to
authority has been state consent. More recently, theorists have identified
considerations of fair play as a basis for international law's legitimacy, or
maintained that the justifiability of international law's claim to authority
rests on it being democratically enacted. I consider each of these approaches
in turn.

Consent
Consent involves a minimum of two parties: an agent who grants another a
claim-right or power and thereby acquires a correlative duty or liability, and
an agent who acquires the right. For example, in signing and ratifying a treaty
setting out the terms that will govern their use of a river that runs through
or along both of their territories, two states may be said to grant one another
rights to conduct that conforms to those terms, and to acquire obligations to
act as the treaty directs. Similarly, in joining the wro, states consent to its
authority to resolve their disputes regarding compliance with their obligations under that treaty. In conforming to the terms of a treaty to which they
have consented, states uphold their duties to one another, which is to say
that in at least one respect they treat one another justly. They may also treat
one another justly because the content of the treaty reflects or determines
what justice truly requires vis-a-vis the use of a common resource, trade, the
use of force, etc. This need not be the case, however; a state that has consented
to govern its conduct according to certain terms may not unilaterally disregard them simply because it believes that justice or its national interest
require contrary conduct. 4 Rather, the state owes its obedience to the other
party or parties to the agreement, or, in other words, the state's consent
makes the norms that comprise the agreement authoritative.
Consent's attraction as a basis for a duty to obey the law rests on its ability
to reconcile a conception of agents as morally free and equal with their submission to authority. If an agent chooses to place himself under a duty to
another, then those duties are the produc~ of the agent's control over his life,
not requirements imposed upon him or a facet of his subjugation to the will
of another agent. If consent is to manifest this kind of control, it must be free
and informed; agreements that are made involuntarily or as a result of fraud
generate neither moral duties nor moral rights. Moreover, one agent may

consent on another's behalf only if the latter authorizes him to do so, since
only then will the resulting obligations be properly characterized as a product
of the obligated agent's control over his life. Finally, the moral freedom and
equality of all agents places limits on the obligations that any can acquire via
consent; even when free and informed, agreements to commit murder, theft,
fraud, etc. are null and void.
Each of the foregoing conditions on the generation of moral obligations
via consent provides a basis for challenging consent-based arguments for
international law's legitimacy. First, in light of the cbsts their citizens are
likely to suffer if they refuse, the consent of economically and militarily weak
states to bilateral or multilateral treaties frequently fails to qualify as voluntary. Even where the costs of non-participation do not rise to the level necessary to render agreement non-voluntary, if the distribution of benefits and
burdens set out in the agreement reflect unrectified past injustices committed by one party against another, then the agreement may still be at odds
with the commitment to the treatment of all as free and equal that underpins
consent-based accounts of legitimacy. Second, states increasingly consent to
general frameworks that are then filled in by treaty-based but partly autonomous bodies that exercise quasi-legislative and/or quasi-judicial powers
(Kumm, 2004: 914). As a consequence, states may find themselves subject to
obligations they did not intend nor even suspect they would acquire when
they consented to the original framework. Generally speaking, while an agent
need not know the precise details of the obligation she is acquiring via
consent, the greater her ignorance of these matters the less compelling it will
be to describe the agent's consent as the exercise of control over her life rather
than as an abdication of control to another. Insofar as a treaty permits signatories to withdraw their consent to its terms, as many do, it might be a11gued
that a state's decision not to do so constitutes its tacit or ongoing consent to
specification of its terms by semi-autonomous international organizations
such as the wro or the International Criminal Court (ICC).Of course, this
argument works o!11Yif the costs of withdrawal from the treaty are not so
high as to render continued submission to it non-voluntary.
Second, the current governments of some and perhaps even many states
lack the legitimate authority to consent to obligations on behalf of the political communities they claim to represent. Clearly this is true if a necessary
condition for state officials having the standing to obligate their citizens
under international law is that the state be sufficiently democratic and
respectful of some core set of its subjects' rights. It may still be true of a fair
number of states even ifwe should employ a somewhat broader understanding of what it is for state officials to adequately represent their citizens.
Whether democratic or not, states may consistently fail to represent the
interests of certain domestic minorities, such as indigenous peoples. The ·
existence of persistent minorities challenges any state's claim to the standing
to acquire obligations on behalf of all its subjects. Finally, some theorists
point to the fact that much international law-making is carried out not by
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states' legislators, but by members of their executive branches, as a reason to
doubt that those who purport to acquire international legal obligations on
their citizens' behalf have the moral standing to do so. In some cases, such
as legislative ratification of treaties negotiated by a state's executive branch,
those who are empowered by a state's constitution to make law have some
say in its acquisition of international legal obligations. Where that amounts
to little more than an up or down vote on terms negotiated entirely, and
perhaps secretively, by the executive, there may be reason to doubt that legislative consent suffices to render the resulting duties consistent with the
treatment of the political community's members as free and equal.
Third, if any international legal norm or regime requires conduct that
treats people in a manner incompatible with a proper understanding of their
moral status as free and equal, then no state's consent to abide by those
norms generates a genuine moral duty to do so. Thus, if Thomas Pogge is
right to maintain that the wro, the IMF, and the World Bank systematically
contribute to the persistence of severe global poverty, and if in doing so they
fail to treat the global poor as a proper understanding of their moral status
as free and equal requires, then no state's consent to rule by these organizations gives rise to a moral obligation to act as they direct (Pogge, 2010). Much
depends on what the proper understanding of people's moral status as free
and equal is, of course. However defined, though, if consent matters because,
and to the extent that, it enables agents to control or shape their lives by
altering their rights, duties, powers, and immunities vis-a-vis others, then it
cannot render permissible - let alone obligatory - conduct at odds with a
proper appreciation for any agent's moral freedom and equality.
The foregoing arguments suggest that even where consent seems most likely
to justify international law's claim to legitimacy, namely with respect to
treaty-based law that applies to states, its success is likely to be piecemeal at
best. This conclusion is only strengthened when we consider customary international law (CIL).Where CILis a product oflongstanding state practice, then
those states that voluntarily and knowingly engage in the practice, or that at
least do not persistently object to it, might be said to tacitly consent to the
norms that structure that practice. Once again, though, this conclusion does
not follow for those states whose participation or failure to object is nonvoluntary; for example, postcolonial states subject to customary international
legal norms developed largely by European powers prior to or during the
colonial era. Consent also appears to be an inadequate basis for the legitimacy
of international legal norms that apply directly to individuals. These observations are typically offered to support the conclusion that at best consent offers
an incomplete ground for international law's legitimacy, but it is worth noting
the possibility of drawing the opposite conclusion, namely that the truth of
the moral view that underpins consent-based accounts of legitimacy simply
shows significant portions of international law to be illegitimate.
Thus far I have focused on the extent to which (state) consent actually provides a successful justification for international law's claim to authority. A
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more basic question, though, is whether consent is even a necessary condition
for international law's legitimacy. If all agents necessarily owe certain moral
duties to non-compatriots, and if they can discharge those duties only by treating international law, or at least certain international legal norms and institutions, as authoritative, then it follows that they have a moral duty to do so. The
necessity of obedience to international law for the discharge of an agent's
natural moral duties may be empirical and contingent, as Raz maintains, or it
may be a conceptual truth,'as Kant argued. In circumstances characterized by
disagreement over what counts as rightful conduct, Kant claimed, agents have
a moral duty to subject themselves to a common juridical order; that is, one
in which all are governed by common standards, rather than each being free
to act on his or her understanding of what counts as the treatment of persons
as free and equal {Kant, 1996/1797: 456). For Kant, then, justice can only be
{fully) realized through the rule of law, or, more precisely, a multilevel legal
order composed of both the domestic law of a republican state and an international law governing relations between such states {and their citizens).
Fair play

The principle of fair play offers an alternative basis for states' and perhaps
other international actors' duty to obey international law (Lefkowitz, 2011).
On one common interpretation, the principle states that agents who benefit
from others' participation in a cooperative scheme have a duty to contribute
their fair share to its operation, as long as they rank receipt of those benefits
at the cost of contributing their fair share to the scheme's operation over not
enjoying those benefits and not bearing the costs of contribution to the
scheme. An agent who fails to contribute his or her fair share when these
conditions are met free-rides on the contributions of others; he or she takes
unfair advantage of others' good faith sacrifices of their liberty or discretion.
As noted above, international law frequently functions to facilitate mutually
advantageous collective action among states and other international actors.
If these actors take the benefits they enjoy as a result of others' deference to
these legal norms to outweigh the costs of deferring themselves, then they
have a fair-play duty to obey the law. In contrast to the aforementioned
instrumental argument for the legitimacy of international legal norms that
facilitate morally mandatory collective action, the fair-play argument treats
deference to such norms as constitutive of the fair treatment of other international actors and required for that very reason, independent of any effects
free-riding on others' obedience to international law may have.

Democracy
At the domestic level, some form of democratic decision-making, understood
in individual-majoritarian terms, is widely viewed as at least a necessary
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condition for legitimacy, so much so that few rulers feel able to go without
at least the fa<;ade of democratic rule. It may seem natural, therefore, to
conclude that the legitimacy of global governance institutions and international law more generally requires that they become more democratic.
Whether this is so depends, however, on the manner in which democracy
contributes to law's legitimacy. Like legitimacy, democratic governance may
be defended on both instrumental and non-instrumental grounds. As an
example of the former, individual-majoritarian decision-making may have
epistemic advantages over the feasible alternatives (Goodin, 2003; Estlund
2009). Depending on how substantive a conception of democratic decisionmaking we employ, it may result in greater collective deliberation than
would otherwise take place. Several important points follow from this observation. First, democracy's instrumental value contributes to its legitimacy
only insofar as it increases the probability that democratically enacted law
meets the NJC - that is, improves its subjects' conformity to right reason.
Second, if democracy is valuable only because its output satisfies the NJC,
then there is little reason to think democracy is a necessary condition for
law's legitimacy. In some cases, non-democratic decision-making procedures
may serve equally well or better at producing legitimate law; for example,
where democratic decision-making procedures systematically lead to unjustifiable discrepancies in the weight or importance given to the interests of
some over others, as state-level democratic governance may do vis-a-vis the
interests of citizens and non-citizens (Buchanan and,Keohane, 2006: 415-16).
Indeed, even if democratically enacted law best satisfies the NJC, nondemocratically enacted law will still be legitimate if no democratic decisionmaking procedure exists and those over whom the law claims authority do
better by deferring to it than by acting on their own judgment. In short, if
democracy's value is entirely instrumental, then international law's democratic deficit need not preclude its legitimacy.
Many of those who defend democratic decision-making as a necessary condition for the legitimacy of domestic law do so on non-instrumental grounds,
however. Thomas Christiano (2008), for example, argues for democratic
authority on the grounds that in circumstances characterized by diversity,
cognitive bias, and fallibility, the treatment of all as moral equals requires
that agents be able to see that the shared institutions that structure their
common lives together treat them as equals. Legitimacy depends on public
equality. This requires in turn that each agent has an equal say in the shaping
of those institutions; or, in other words, that the legal order that frames their
interactions with one another be the product of, or at least subject to control
by, a democratic assembly. Yet Christiano resists the extension of this last
claim to the international legal order. In part he worries that a global peoples'
assembly would fail to be sufficiently democratic; for example, it might too
readily produce persistent minorities and thereby fail to instantiate a public
commitment to the moral equality of all (2010: 133-4). More intriguing,
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though, is his argument that, at a global level, the public treatment of all as
equals does not call for democratic governance, and need never do so (2010:
130-3). Rather, Christiano maintains that a form of democratic governance
in which each individual has an equal say in shaping political and legal
institutions is called for only among those who share a common world,
defined as one in which there is a great deal of interdependence among
agents' interests and where each has a roughly equal stake in the normative
order produced or sustained by the institution's rule.
Consider the latter point first. If a system of rules will affect two parties to
very different degrees, with one party's life barely impacted while the other's
plans and prospects are deeply dependent upon the content of these rules,
then it would be unfair to give them an equal say in settling what those rules
should be. To do so would give the first party too much control over the
second, with the latter unable to view the process as one that publicly treats
all parties as moral equals. But why does the public equality argument for
democratic rule apply only when there is a great deal of interdependence
among agents' interests? Why not treat each interest or issue separately?
Christiano replies that 'since democratic decision-making must be taken by
majority rule, it is important that there be many issues so that those who
come up losers on some· issues be winners on others' (2010: 131}. In the
absence of recurring decision-making on a bundle of issues, losers in a
majority-rule process have little reason to view it as publicly treating them
as equals. Like permanent minorities, they have no procedural evidence,
namely victories in the decision-making process, that they can point to as
reason to believe that the governing institution is truly committed to the
equal treatment of all those it rules.
Christiano acknowledges a few instances of interdependence among the
interests of all individuals around the world, as in the case of climate change.
However, he maintains that international legal institutions governing trade
and the environment typically impact individuals' interests far less than
domestic legal orders do, and, at least by implication, not enough to meet
the first of the two conditions for the existence of a common world. Moreover,
even when international legal norms do impact the lives of individuals
around the world, they do so to very different degrees. The life plans and
prospects of some individuals may depend a great deal on international trade,
while for others the impact may be quite small. Were all to exercise an equal
say in determining the international rules that ought to govern cross-border
trade, then those whose lives depend heavily upon those rules could rightly
complain that the procedure for governing global trade did not publicly treat
them as moral equals.
Christiano rightly rejects the inference from the fact that the conduct of
people in one state affects the interests of those living in other states (or, more
narrowly, affects those interests that ground human rights) to the conclusion
that the former can treat the latter justly only by submitting to a common
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legal order whose laws are enacted by a directly elected global parliament.
However, the arguments he offers to support this conclusion elide the fundamental error in the inference, namely that if it is possible for agents to treat
one another justly by limiting their interactions so that they do not threaten
to setback one another's fundamental interests, then they are not morally
required to submit to a common set of rules that govern these interactions.
Instead, the decision to do so is one over which agents exercise moral discretion. The question of whether agents are morally required to submit to a
common set of rules regulating some type of conduct is prior to the question
of how the rules of such an order ought to be made if they are to be legitimate.
The principle of public equality provides an answer to the latter question,
but to answer the former, Christiano needs a version of the affected interests
principle, namely one that holds that agents have a duty to submit to a
common legal order if and only if doing so is necessary to avoid setbacks to
their own and/or to others' fundamental interest in judgment.
Rather than a global democratic assembly, Christiano maintains that
efforts to establish international law's legitimacy should focus on making it
the product of, or subject to control by, a fair system of voluntary association
among highly representative states, or a fair democratic association (2010:
126-9). In principle, at least, state-level democratic procedures could offer
individuals a voice in the shaping of international legal norms, and in practice they migqt better serve this end than would other legislative mechanisms, even if they fell well short of the ideal. An international legal order in
which all states' commitments were genuinely voluntary, and in which the
procedures for legislating, applying, and enforcing international legal rules
and decisions did not reflect unjustifiable asymmetries in bargaining power,
would be one whose product or operation could be viewed by all individuals
as committed to their equal treatment. Moreover, the justification of international law's legitimacy in the moral ideal of a free and equal association
of internally legitimate democratic states provides a non-consensual basis for
the legitimacy of those international legal norms that rule out conduct at
odds with such an ideal - for example, the jus cogensprohibitions on slavery,
genocide and aggressive war. Were the conditions for fair democratic association met, all individuals would have compelling reason to believe that both
the domestic and the international institutions of collective governance to
which they were subject were committed to the equal treatment of all, and
so their efforts to rule them legitimate.
It may be worth emphasizing that Christiano does not deny that some
existing international legal norms and practices enable agents residing in
one state to violate the basic rights (or setback the fundamental interests) of
people living in other states. Nor does his argument necessarily entail that
the morally optimal world is one in which states, or the common worlds they
constitute, exist as independent islands subject only to international legal
rules that aim to preserve their independence. Rather, Christiano maintains
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only that efforts to reform the existing international legal order so that it
satisfies the principle of public equality, and therefore enjoys legitimacy,
should be in the direction of creating a free democratic association, not a
global democratic parliament.
Yet the fair democratic association model of global governance confronts
a serious difficulty. If voluntary agreements are to conform to the principle
of public equality, they must be negotiated and entered into in free and fair
conditions. Securing such conditions, however, requires a public law whose
legitimacy cannot itself depend upon voluntary agreement. A legitimate
public international law consists in a set of impartial rules that aim at the
common good, and such rules cannot themselves be the product of agreements in which parties act partially, that is, to advance their own interests.
This is true even if actors seek to advance their interests only within what
they take to be the moral limits on doing so, for the very reasons that
Christiano offers when defending the legitimacy of a liberal democratic
state's domestic law. 5 The conclusion Christiano draws is that realizing the
conditions for a free democratic association 'seems to drive us in the direction
of global institutions, which in turn must be evaluated in terms of democratic
principles' (2011: 92). This appears to leave us at an impasse, unable to ground
international law's legitimacy in either its enactment by a global democratic
•legislature or in a voluntary association of democratic states.

4 Why Care About Legitimacy?
The foregoing discussion suggests that, at present, international law enjoys
less, and perhaps far less, legitimacy than it claims (or that some claim on its
behalf). Does that matter? Yes and no. As I mentioned earlier, one conclusion
we should be careful not to draw from the illegitimacy of international legal
norms or global governance institutions is that agents have no moral reasons
to support them, including in some cases acting as they require, or to work for
their reform rather than their replacement. Crucially, though, the sort of arguments that can be offered in support of complying with illegitimate rules and
institutions differs from the one available when rules and institutions are
legitimate, namely that one has a moral duty to obey those rules and institutions. Moreover, where international law's illegitimacy owes largely to its being
an instrument for the unjust advancement of national or special interests by
the relatively powerful, the less powerful may have little choice but to play by
the existing legal rules. Doing so may be the right thing to do not only prudentially but also morally, if conduct that violates those rules is either unlikely to
bring about a more just world or, possibly, if there are limits on the setbacks
to their own interests that agents must bear in order to combat injustice.
Nevertheless, there are compelling reasons to pursue the goal of a more
legitimate international legal order. First, greater legitimacy entails an
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increase in justice. This conclusion follows necessarily from Raz's account of
what makes law legitimate; a world with more legitimate law is one in
which actors more often conform to right reason than they do in a world
with less legitimate law. Empirically, we have compelling evidence that
mechanisms of accountability, transparency, and participation in the crafting of law and in governance more generally typically lead to outcomes
widely viewed as just, or at least as more just than those produced by governance in the absence of such mechanisms. Second, it seems plausible to maintain that an increase in the actual or de jure legitimacy of international law
will lead to an increase in its defacto legitimacy, which will in turn increase
international law's actual legitimacy by making it more effective at guiding
its subjects conduct. 6 The converse point may be even more powerful; the
failure to pursue greater legitimacy for the international legal order may
lead to more injustice as justifiable cynicism erodes some of the advances in,
for example, managing conflicts, promoting human rights, and protecting
the environment to which international law has been a significant contributor. Third, it may be possible to reach greater agreement regarding when
international law enjoys legitimacy than when it is just. Recall in this regard
Christiano's argument that democratic governance allows individuals to see
the political institution that rules them as committed to the equal advancement of all its subjects' interests even when the substance of some of its laws
offers reason to doubt it. Legitimacy also requires less than justice, both in
terms of what it takes for an agent to enjoy legitimate authority and in terms
of the duty it.imposes on agents. In particular, an agent may concede the
law's legitimacy while working to change it (perhaps even by acts of civil
disobedience), which may make actors more willing to concede a norm's
legitimacy than its justice. Finally, it may be that we should be more concerned with the legitimacy of international law than with its justice. The
aforementioned possibility that we are more likely to achieve widespread
agreement on legitimacy than on justice provides a pragmatic reason to
draw this conclusion. Although justice is the ideal, legitimacy may be the
best we can do, and therefore, at the very least, we should be extremely hesitant to risk a diminution in international law's legitimacy for an increase in
its justice. There is also a principled argument for focusing more on legitimacy than on justice, however, namely the one associated with Kant and
briefly mentioned above, according to which just relations between agents
can only be realized within a particular kind oflegal order.7 Only in a republican legal order can agents enjoy freedom as independence or nondomination, meaning lives in which they neither exercise arbitrary control
over others nor are subject to such control themselves. If these are the terms
in which we ought to understand justice, then the pursuit of global justice
requires nothing more, but nothing less, than the realization of a fully legitimate international legal order.
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Chapter 4 Global Political Justice
1 By 'power', 1 mean the capacity of an agent to bring about its goals. By 'political
power', I mean power exercised within and through political institutions, which
are sites for the organized contestation and collaborative pursuit of multiple
agents' varied goals.
2 By 'domination', I mean arbitrary or institutionally uncontrolled power (see Pettit,
2012).
3 It is important to note, however, that the distinctions between these two types of
global justice theories are far from clean, and that theoretical problems of these
two kinds are deeply intertwined in some areas of debate - for instance in arguments about the character and normative significance of the 'global basic structure' (Ronzoni, 2009).
4 The justificatory structures for internationalist and cosmopolitan models of global
democracy are thereby parallel, albeit with the input of different assumptions at
endogenous and exogenous levels; for further discussion, see Macdonald, 2003.
5 Accounts of this kind depend in part on values exogenous to the democratic ideal,
in order to specify whichinterestswarrant special democratic empowerment within
transnational political institutions.
6 It is important to note that the authors I cite here invoke varying conceptions of
the 'political' and the nature of 'political' institutions, some of which differ from
the conception I am invoking here (as described in note 1). As such, not all would
use the label 'political', as I do, to describe the international institutions that are
subjects of legitimacy assessments.

Chapter 5 The Legitimacy of International Law

1 This characterization of ruling or governing takes practical authority to be its
essential feature. Some contend instead that coercion constitutes its essential
feature, so that ruling or governing consists of enacting, applying and enforcing
the law, but not necessarily commanding or ordering conduct; i.e., asserting that
subjects have a duty to obey the law as such. I discuss the relation between legitimate authority and coercion later in this section. For an overview of different
conceptions of political legitimacy, see Peter, 2014.
2 Three points warrant mention, lest the reader take the argument in the text to
show the legitimacy or illegitimacy of international law to be practically irrelevant. First, to claim that on some occasions an agent ought to act as an illegitimate
authority would have her act is not to say that she should always, or even often,
do so. Second, it is quite common to appeal to legal obligation both in private
deliberation and public justification or criticism. It is worth considering, therefore, when such arguments succeed and when they do not - i.e., when law is
legitimate and when it is not- even ifin some cases where such appeals carry no
weight there are independent moral and/or prudential reasons to do 1that which
the law would have one do. Finally, it may be that some of the moral value of
conformity to law can be realized only if the law is legitimate; for instance, if
obedience to legitimate law is not merely a means to treating others justly, but
constitutes respect for others' equal claim to determine what justice requires. I
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develop these last two points in slightly greater detail in the final section of this
chapter.
These two categories correspond closely to the categories of output and input
legitimacy employed by many international relations or IR-influenced scholars;
see Bodansky. 2013: 330.
Note that the claim here concerns whose judgment regardingwhat justice requires
ought to control. As I discuss below, an agent's consent to perform some act
cannot render permissible what it would otherwise be unjust for him to do.
See also Pogge, 2002, for an argument that partiality is permissible only within
the confines of impartial rules structuring interactions between states, not in the
making of the rules that are to govern those interactions.
See Bodansky, 2013, for a brief overview of empirical studies regarding factors
contributing to international law's defacto legitimacy.
This conclusion holds for Christiano as well.

Chapter 6 Legitimacy and Global Governance

1 We would like to thank Eva Maria Nag and David Lefkowitz for their extensive
written comments on this chapter.

Chapter 7 Just War and Global Justice

1 In his piece, to which I am indebted and which has partly inspired my work on
this subject, Nardin suggests that designing a general framework for thinking
about just war and global justice is an important challenge for political theory,
and hypothesizes (drawing on Kant) that focusing on the justifiability of coercion
might help us address it. As a first step in building such a framework, Nardin then
discusses the ethics of humanitarian intervention. This discussion, though, suggests that Nardin himself has not fully appreciated the implications of his original
insight. He argues that humanitarian intervention is grounded in concerns of
justice, rather than beneficence. From this, he extrapolates a general duty of
justice to protect people from violence. But, he continues, 'if states have a duty
to intervene when people are being massacred, they might also have a duty to act
[coercively] when people are dying of starvation or disease' (2006: 464). Nardin
then concludes that 'a coercive (tax-based) scheme of global poverty relief might
be justified' (2006: 465). The problem with this argument is that it does not show
any so-far unappreciated connection between global justice and just war theory.
If one's preferred theory of justice says that the current global distribution of
entitlements is unjust, then it followsthat coercion may be rightfully employed to
enforce the correct scheme. The idea that people might be taxed for the sake of
justice is one most theorists of justice already accept. The more interesting point,
which I try to develop in this chapter, is not that justice-based entitlements may
be rightfully enforced, but that war itself (which involves not only the use of coercion, but of lethal coercion) can be seen as a species of enforcement of entitlements.
This, in turn, opens up the possibility for mutual testing between theories of the
just war (specifically jus ad bellum) and theories of global justice - a possibility
Nardin himself does not consider.

